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The consensus among leading commentators on legal ethics issues is that
the legal ethics codes' embody an adversarial ethic.2 An examination of the
historical roots of the legal ethics codes in the work of George Sharswood,
a nineteenth century jurist and scholar provides an alternative interpreta-
tion.3 Although largely ignored by commentators today, Sharswood's essay
on ethics was the original source of most of the modern legal ethics codes.
4
Sharswood believed that a lawyer's principal obligation was the republican
pursuit of the community's common good even where it conflicts with ei-
ther her client's or her own interests.5 Sharswood defined the common good
as the protection of order, liberty, and property in order to provide individ-
uals with the opportunity to perfect themselves. 6
Although Sharswood's essay does not govern interpretation of the mod-
ern codes, it has had significant influence on their content and language.
The drafters of the first national code, the American Bar Association
(ABA) Canons of Ethics,7 expressly acknowledged that they were borrow-
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1. The term codes refers collectively to the ABA's Canons of Ethics, Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
2. See discussion infra Part V.A.
3. George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics, 32 A.B.A. REP. 1 (5th ed. 1907). The draft-
ers of the 1908 ABA CANONS OF ETHICS [hereinafter CANONS] relied upon this edition of Sharswood's
essay. 33 A.B.A. REP. 568 (1908). The essay was first published as A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE
AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF LAW, DELIVERED BEFORE THE LAW CLASS OF THE UNIVER-
SITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (1854).
4. See discussion infra Part V.A.
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. CANONS OF ETHICS, 33 A.B.A. REP. 575 (1908) [hereinafter CANONS]. Although officially termed
the Canons of Ethics, they were popularly referred to as the Canons of Professional Ethics. See, e.g.,
HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 309 (1953) (referring to the Canons as the Canons of Professional
Ethics).
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ing language and ideas from Sharswood's treatise.8 The ABA's subsequent
codification of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 19709 and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 198 3t ° have retained much of
the subject matter the Canons adopted from Sharswood, departing from
the Canons only in the mechanisms for enforcing ethical standards."
Therefore, the Model Code and the Model Rules, like the Canons before
them, preserve lawyers' opportunities to act primarily as public officers
with broad discretion and authority to substitute their moral judgments for
those of their clients.' 2 The profession's purported adherence to the adver-
sarial ethic demonstrates that modern commentators have not fully appre-
ciated the implications of these concepts retained from Sharswood's
treatise.
While this article examines the significant impact that Sharswood's trea-
tise had upon the drafting of the codes, it does not propose a normative
valuation of the existing ethical standards or of Sharswood's republican vi-
sion. However, this examination of Sharswood's influence will contribute to
the ongoing debate regarding the proper role of lawyers. Sharswood's work
provides powerful historical precedent for those who oppose the adversarial
role of attorneys. At the same time it also raises serious questions about
whether this approach offers a feasible alternative to the adversarial ethic.
For defenders of the adversarial role, this republican reading of the ethics
codes suggests that it would require major revisions of the Model Code and
the Model Rules in order to obtain compliance with the adversarial model.
Part II of this article contrasts Sharswood's central role in the develop-
ment of the legal ethics codes with the limited role which modern commen-
tators assign him. Next, Part III describes Sharswood's republican vision of
legal ethics. Sharswood's guidelines for ethical lawyer conduct are outlined
in Part IV, and Sharswood's vision is traced through the Canons into the
Model Code and the Model Rules. Finally, Part V.A suggests reasons why
modern commentators have neglected Sharswood and therefore misread
the legal ethics codes, and the remainder of Part V discusses the implica-
tions of reading the codes in light .of their historical context on the current
debate regarding lawyers' ethical and professional responsibilities.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
11. See discussion infra Parts II.A., IV.C.
12. See discussion infra Parts IV, V.A.
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II. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN SHARSWOOD'S CENTRAL ROLE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL ETHICS CODES AND HIS MINOR ROLE IN
MODERN COMMENTARY
The importance of Sharswood's nineteenth century essay to understand-
ing our current legal ethics codes will be discussed in this section. First,
this section outlines how the language of Sharswood's essay found its way
into the Canons and thereby the Model Code and the Model Rules. Next,
it contrasts the pivotal role of Sharswood's essay with current commenta-
tors' inattention to Sharswood's influence. It suggests, as Part V.A. dis-
cusses further, that the lack of attention to Sharswood's work has resulted
in an incomplete understanding of the legal ethics codes.
A. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF SHARSWOOD'S ESSAY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE LEGAL ETHICS CODES
When the ABA adopted the first national legal ethics code in 1908,
Sharswood's text was well-known and its formative contribution acknowl-
edged. The Canons setting forth the lawyer's major duties to the courts,
the bar, and the client, and all but seven of the original thirty-two Canons,
are drawn in whole or in part from Sharswood. The current ethical guide-
lines, the Model Code and the Model Rules, have retained the substantive
content of the Canons and have changed only the mechanisms for enforce-
ment of the ethical standards.
Sharswood's essay was studied by those ABA members who drafted the
Canons. At the request of the committee charged with drafting the new
ethical code, the ABA reprinted and mailed to all members a 214 page
edition of Sharswood's essay. 3 When the Canons were subsequently
adopted, they bore the imprint of Sharswood's essay. The original printing
of the Canons in the ABA Reports, pursuant to the direction of the Ca-
nons' drafters, began with Sharswood's exhortation that "[h]igh moral
principle is the [lawyer's] only safe guide, the only torch to light his way
amidst darkness and obstruction."' 14
The language of the Canons drew heavily on the 1887 Alabama State
Bar Code of Ethics, 15 which largely represented a codification of the princi-
13. 31 AB.A. REP. 63-64 (1907). Sharswood's essay was printed as 32 A.B.A. REP. 1 (1907). Other
materials provided to the ABA by the Committee on the Code of Professional Ethics included compila-
tions of 12 state's ethics codes (which were largely based on Sharswood's essay), David Hoffman's
Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, and Dr. Samuel Johnson's The Lawyer's Prayer.
31 A.B.A. REP. 679 (1907).
14. 33 A.B.A. REP. 574, 571 (1908).
15. Id. at 569-70. Judge Thomas Goode Jones, the drafter of the Alabama Code, was a member of
the ABA drafting committee and played a major role in drafting the Canons. Id.
1992]
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pies contained in Sharswood's essay. 16 The drafting committee quoted with
approval the statement of an earlier commentator of the day who observed
that:
[a]nyone who is familiar with the little book by Judge Sharswood on 'Le-
gal Ethics' will readily see how large a part of [the Alabama] code has
been drawn from that source. Many of its maxims have been transferred
word for word from Sharswood's treatise, and this is certainly its best
recommendation. 17
The following year when the drafting committee introduced the Canons on
the floor of the ABA, the presenter noted that the Canons were "based
upon Sharswood's Legal Ethics."' 8
A textual comparison of the Canons with Sharswood's essay underscores
this acknowledgement. One example of the drafters' use of Sharswood's
language is the well-known phrase found in the only passage of the Canons
punctuated with quotation marks: "[t]he lawyer owes 'entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability . . . "'19 The
Canons do not provide attribution for the quotation, but it is taken from
Sharswood's essay.20 The use of Sharswood's unattributed quotation for
this central proposition indicates not only reliance on Sharswood but also
broad familiarity with his work among the readers of the Canons.
The other ideas ahd language borrowed from Sharswood that appear in
the Canons are generally paraphrased. For example, Canon 6, which bars
conflicts of interest, incorporates many of Sharswood's phrases without
quotation marks. 2' Other Canons which do not use Sharswood's exact
16. See 31 A.BA. REP. 676, 678. Judge Jones kept a copy of Sharswood's essay on his desk and
consulted it when drafting the Alabama Code. Walter B. Jones, Canons of Professional Ethics, Their
Genesis and History, 7 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483, 484 (1932).
17. 31 A.B.A. REP. 678 (1907) (quoting Ky. B.A. REP. 25 (1903)).
18. 33 A.B.A. REP. 56 (1908).
19. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 15.
20. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 78-79.
21. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 6, which begins with the admonition that:
[it is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circum-
stances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy,
which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
The language of Canon 6 repeats words and concepts from a passage from Sharswood's essay which
states that:
the. advocate is bound in honor, as well as duty, to disclose to the client at the time of the
retainer, every circumstance of his own connection with the parties or prior relation to the
controversy, which can or may influence his determination in the selection of him for the
office.
Sharswood, supra note 3, at 109-10. The above language of Canon 6 incorporates Sharswood's rule
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words nevertheless adopt his prescriptions. For example, Canon 3, which
prohibits ex parte conversations with judges, summarizes in one sentence a
paragraph from Sharswood.22
Some of the Canons follow the spirit of Sharswood's essay but adopt less
rigorous edicts. For example, Sharswood teaches that court-appointed
counsel for criminal defendants "cannot decline the office." 23 Canon 4,
however, permits a lawyer to decline appointment but instructs that "[a]
lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to be
excused for any trivial reason ...-14
As discussed in Part IV infra, the seven of the thirty-two original Ca-
nons not drawn from Sharswood are nonetheless consistent with his vi-
sion.25 These seven Canons deal with merit selection of judges,26 differences
requiring disclosure of conflicts to the client "at the time of the retainer." The words "duty," "time of
retainer," and "controversy" remain. The changes in language appear to reflect minor editing. For
example, the drafters changed Sharswood's "selection of him for the office" to read "selection of coun-
sel," and modified Sharswood's "every circumstance of his own connection with the parties" to read
"all the circumstances of his relations to the parties."
22. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 3, which instructs that "[a] lawyer should not communicate or
argue privately with the Judge as to the merits of a pending cause, and he deserves rebuke and denun-
ciation for any device or attempt to gain from a Judge special personal consideration or favor." This
sentence summarizes and omits explanitory language from the following passage:
[a]nother plain duty of counsel is to present everything in the cause to the court openly in
the course of the public discharge of its duties. It is not often, indeed, that gentlemen of the
Bar so far forget themselves as to attempt to exert privately an influence upon the judge, to
seek private interviews, or take occasional opportunities of accidental, or social meetings to
make ex parte statements, or to endeavor to impress their views. They know that such con-
duct is wrong in itself and has a tendency to impair confidence in the administration of
justice, which ought not only to be pure but unsuspected.
Sharswood, supra note 3, at 66.
23. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 91.
24. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 4. Similar examples are the Canons relating to suing clients and
contingency fees. Sharswood acknowledges that the law permits suing clients to recover fees but sug-
gests that the better practice is not to do so. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 151-52. Canon 14 incorporates
the spirit of Sharswood's approach by disfavoring the practice of suing clients to recover fees while
permitting it. Canon 14 provides that "[clontroversies with clients concerning compensation are to be
avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his self-respect and with his right to receive
reasonable recompense for his services; and lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to prevent
injustice, imposition or fraud." CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 14.
In a related manner, Sharswood states that contingent fees are unethical but recognizes that they are
legal. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 153-64. Canon 13 did not prohibit contingency fees, but it did
require that, "where sanctioned by law, [contingent fee agreements] should be under the supervision of
the Court, in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges." CANONS, supra note 7, at
Canon 13. The question of contingency fees provided the only significant debate at the ABA meeting
.which adopted the Canons. 33 A.B.A. REP. 61-85 (1908). Indeed, the ABA modified the committee
draft to add the phrase 'in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges." Id. at 579.
25. The ABA originally adopted 32 Canons. ABA revisions in 1928, 1933, and 1937, together added
a total of 15 Canons for a total of forty-seven. DRINKER, supra note 7, at 309 n.l. This section and
infra Part III focus on the original 32 Canons without particular analysis of the 15 later Canons. Each
of them, however, is either related to, or consistent with, Sharswood's ethical teaching. The new Canons
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of opinion with professional colleagues,27 communication with adverse par-
ties,28 lawyer testimony,29 newspaper publicity, 0 advertising," and exposing
lawyer misconduct. 2
Although the ABA replaced the Canons with the Model Code in 1970
and the Model Rules in 1983,11 Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. has
stated that "the content of the legal profession's narrative and core ethical
rules, as pronounced in the 1908 Canons, has been preserved largely un-
changed in today's Model Rules. '3 4 The Model Rules "enforce three core
values: loyalty, confidentiality and candor to the court."35
Professor Hazard, the Reporter to the Commission that drafted the
Model Rules, notes that what has changed from the Canons to the Model
Code and Model Rules is the mechanism for enforcement of ethical stan-
dards. The Canons represented "fraternal norms issuing from an autono-
mous professional society [that] have now been transformed into a body of
judicially enforced regulations."36 The Model Code moves to a mix be-
tween ethical aspirations and disciplinary rules while the Model Rules re-
elaborate on: restrictions on recruiting clients (Canons 33, 35, 44 and 46); compensation arrangements
(Canons 34, 38 and 42; and newspaper publicity (Canon 40). The new Canons also added provisions
regarding: client confidences (Canon 37); witness interviews (Canon 39); client fraud (Canon 41); with-
drawal (Canon 44); unauthorized practice of law (Canon 47); application of the Canons to specialists
(45); and retirement from a position as judge or public employee (Canon 36). DRINKER, supra note 7,
at app. C.
26. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 2.
27. Id. at Canon 7.
28. Id. at Canon 9.
29. Id. at Canon 19.
30. Id. at Canon 20.
31. Id. at Canon 27.
32. Id. at Canon 29.
33. Of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 35 followed the lead of the ABA and adopted the
Model Rules. Fourteen jurisdictions continue to use the Model Code, one has adopted a structural and
substantive amalgam of the Model Code and the Model Rules, and one has its own unique ethics code.
5 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1:3-1:4 (July 15, 1992).
34. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249 (1991). Most
commentators agree with Professor Hazard. See, e.g., Forest J. Bowman, The Proposed Model Rules
of Professional Conduct: What Hath the ABA Wrought? 13 PAC. L.J. 273, 286 (1982) ("In matters of
basic ethics, however, the changes in the new Code were mostly variations of emphasis and scope" and
involved only four areas: fee splitting, use of the title "doctor," leaving a legislator's name on the firm
name, and neglect of a legal matter). Even those who suggest a- break between the Canons and the
Model Code do not suggest a basic change in content and vision. Rather, they point to differences in
procedures and the inclusion of the lawyer's role as negotiator and counselor. See, e.g., MONROE
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICs 4 (1990) (stating that the ABA repudiated the Canons
because they "failed to give adequate guidance, lacked coherence, omitted reference to important areas
of practice, and did not lend themselves to meaningful disciplinary enforcement"). Professor Hazard
agrees that the Model Code and Model Rules represent a similar change in emphasis, especially with
regard to enforcement. Hazard, supra, at 1249-51.
35. Hazard, supra, at 1246.
36. Id. at 1249.
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present a formal, "enforceable legal code." 7
Accordingly, while the enforcement mechanisms of today's legal ethics
codes have departed from Sharswood's text, they continue to rely in large
part on the substance of Sharswood's essay. The significance of this reli-
ance for interpretation of the Model Code and the Model Rules will be
discussed in Part IV.
B. SHARSWOOD'S MINOR ROLE IN MODERN LEGAL ETHICS COMMENTARY
Despite Sharswood's significant contribution to the development of the
modern legal ethics codes, commentators have failed to appreciate the im-
portance of Sharswood's essay when interpreting the Model Code and the
Model Rules. Most modern commentators acknowledge that Sharswood's
essay was the source of the Canons.38 However, they generally treat Shar-
swood's contribution in a cursory manner.39 Those commentators who have
acknowledged Sharswood's theoretical perspective have often mistakenly
overstated either his commitment to the adversarial ethic 40 or his opposition
to it.4
1
37. Id. at 1250-51.
38. See, e.g., JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 41 (1976); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. and DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 93 (1988); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY xvii-xviii (1988); THOMAS MORGAN and RONALD ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY I I
(5th ed. 1991); Bowman, supra note 34, at 282 (explaining that "Thomas Goode Jones' creation, itself
Judge Sharswood's essay in many respects, became the ethical guide of the American legal
profession").
39. For example, in his treatise on legal ethics, Professor Charles Wolfram only mentions Sharswood
twice. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 10.3.1 (1986). Wolfram notes that the Ca-
nons' unattributed quotation regarding zealous representation is a quote from Sharswood's essay and
credits Sharswood, incorrectly, as the author who "first expressed" the principle of zealous representa-
tion. Id. See David Hoffman, Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, in 2 DAVID HOFF-
MAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752, 758 (2d ed. 1836) ("To my clients I will be faithful; and in
their causes, zealous and industrious") [hereinafter Hoffman, Resolutions]. Wolfram also observes in a
footnote that the Canons' drafters closely followed the Alabama Code which was modeled on Shar-
swood's essay. WOLFRAM, supra, at § 2.6.2, n.21.
40. Professor Maxwell Bloomfield views Sharswood as a transitional figure in the move from the
gentleman-lawyer ethic which focused on the practitioner's conscience to the modern adversarial ethic
focused on "the external guidelines provided by the legal process." Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoff-
man and the Shaping of a-Republican Legal Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 687 (1979) [hereinafter
Bloomfield, Hoffman]. In his text on legal ethics, Professor Thomas Shaffer states that Sharswood's
essay "finds moral authority in the profession itself." THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS:
TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS xxvi, 355-58, 367-68 (1985). Bloomfield and Shaffer, how-
ever, neglect the dominant role in Sharswood's text of the republican lawyer's duty to exercise indepen-
dent moral authority, including the counter-majoritarian protection of property and the responsibility
for making moral decisions that could limit client representation. For a discussion of Sharswood's per-
spective, see infra Part III.
41. Dean L. Roy Patterson, in contrast to Professors Shaffer and Bloomfield, neglects Sharswood's
commitment to the adversarial system. Patterson mistakenly argues that Sharswood articulates a vision
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Although the misreading of Sharswood will be discussed in Part V.A.
infra, one example demonstrates that ignorance of Sharswood's work has
distorted modern understanding of the legal ethics codes. Commentators
generally assert that legal ethics originated in Henry Brougham's famous
"credo" that " '[a]n advocate, in the discharge of duty, knows but one per-
son in all the world, and that person is his client.' "42 Indeed, one leading
commentator has described Brougham's statement as "[t]he legal profes-
sion's basic narrative ... sustained over two centuries' notwithstanding per-
vasive changes in American society and in the profession itself. '43
An examination of Sharswood's essay raises questions about the wisdom
of this description. Sharswood's work, which was the basis for the Canons
and later evolved into the Model Code and the Model Rules, expressly
rejects Brougham's credo as the basis for legal ethics standards. 44 The re-
mainder of this article will explain Sharswood's republican conception of
legal ethics standards and consider its implications for our current under-
standing of the legal ethics codes.
III. GEORGE SHARSWOOD'S VISION OF LEGAL ETHICS45
A. BACKGROUND
In 1854, when George Sharswood wrote his essay on professional ethics,
he was Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a sitting
Judge in the Pennsylvania courts. 46 He had been a Democratic legislator
of reciprocal agency between lawyer and client, even though Sharswood never suggests that the client is
the agent of the lawyer. L. Roy Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY
LJ. 909, 913 (1980). Patterson also errs in suggesting that Sharswood did not value the duty of confi-
dentiality. Id. at 915. Although Patterson does recognize the survival in the modern codes of Shar-
swood's emphasis on the "duties of candor and fairness," he fails to recognize how the survival of
Sharswood's vision in the language of the modern codes qualifies the adversarial ethic. Id. at 912-15.
42. LUBAN, supra note 38, at 54-55. See also, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 34, at 65-66 (describing
Brougham's credo as "classic statement" of ideal of zealous representation); Hazard, supra note 34, at
144 (describing Brougham's credo as "profession's basic narrative"); WOLFRAM, supra note 39, at 580
(stating that Brougham's credo today "reflect[s] the dominant, although hardly universal, professional
ethic"). In 1820, Lord Brougham made these comments in the House of Lords as part of his defense of
Queen Caroline against charges of adultery brought on behalf of George IV. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE
CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 188-89 (1973). Brougham's comments implied a threat to reveal the King's
previous secret marriage to a Roman Catholic, which would potentially have thrown England into tur-
moil. Id. Ultimately, the charges against Queen Caroline were dropped. Id. See also Thomas L. Shaf-
fer, Lord Brougham - the devious advocate, RES GESTAE 184 (Oct. 1983).
43. Hazard, supra note 34, at 1244.
44. See discussion infra Part l1I.B.3.
45. This analysis of Sharswood's vision is based on his essay on professional ethics, Sharswood, supra
note 3, and not the whole corpus of his work.
46. Samuel Dickson, George Sharswood, in 6 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 123, 134-37, 144-46
(1909); 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 28-29 (Dumas Malone, ed., Charles Scribner's Sons
1964)(1935) [hereinafter DICTIONARY].
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and was elevated to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1867 where he
eventually served as Chief Justice.4 7 As a scholar, Sharswood was best
known for his annotations of English treatises, including an edition of
Blackstone that was reputed to be the most popular in nineteenth-century
America 8.4  His best known original work was his essay on ethics, which
was based on his lectures to the students of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School. 49
At the time Sharswood wrote, many of the practices and institutions now
considered basic to the profession had been introduced, including the sys-
tematic publication of cases, the publication of learned treatises and the
establishment of law schools.5 0 After mixed success early in the nineteenth
century, law schools were moving toward established status by mid-cen-
tury.51 Sharswood is often described as the founder of the University of
Pennsylvania's Law School even though the law school officially opened
many years before Sharswood's tenure.12
The legal profession of the early nineteenth century faced challenges
similar to those facing the profession today. At the forefront of debate
within and outside the profession were questions regarding whether law
was a business or a profession53 and whether a lawyer should serve as a
"hired gun" for clients.54 The challenge to a lawyer's adversarial role arose
both from those who distrusted the role of law and lawyers in making de-
terminations of right and wrong,55 and those who challenged the lawyer's
47. Dickson, supra note 46, at 131-33, 146; DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 28-29; Gary Nash, The
Philadelphia Bench and Bar, 1800-1861, 7 COMP. STUDIES IN Soc. & HIST. 203, 207-08 (1965).
48. Dickson, supra note 46, at 144-46; Memorial, in GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS 5 (5th ed. 1884).
49. Dickson, supra note 46, at 144; DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 28-29.
50. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 322-33 (1985); PERRY MILLER, THE
LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 109-10 (1965).
51. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S
1-21 (1983); Nash, supra note 47, at 207-08.
52. Dickson, supra note 46, at 144-46. The law school was closed when its founder retired and it did
not continuously operate again until Sharswood's professorship. See also Nash, supra note 47, at 207-
08; DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 29.
53. Compare MILLER, supra note 50, at 99-116 (describing nineteenth century views of lawyers as
disinterested experts in the science of justice) and Bloomfield, Hoffman, supra note 40 (characterizing
lawyers as agents of the common good) with MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY 1776-1876 150-51 (1976) [hereinafter BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS]
(describing nineteenth century views of law as merely a business). Bloomfield quotes an 1856 commen-
tator as stating of lawyers "[wle are clever men of business, as a mass, and no more." Id. See GORDON
S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 284, 323-25, 346 (1991)[hereinafter
WOOD, RADICALISM].
54. MILLER, supra note 50, at 100-04, 187, 203-06 (1965).
55. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 53, at 145; MILLER, supra note 50, at 102-04;
Nash, supra note 47, at 210-14; WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 53, at 284, 323-25.
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role as an advocate in an adversarial system.56 The latter critics claimed
that justice, good and evil could be readily known. 57 Therefore, a profession
of experts to serve as intermediaries between lay persons and the justice
system was not necessary.58 They also argued that in disputes one party is
necessarily wrong and lawyers' advocacy of this wrong position would only
obfuscate the truth.59
B. A REPUBLICAN VISION OF LEGAL ETHICS
Sharswood attempted to address these concerns by proposing a system of
legal ethics that embraced a republican vision of the lawyer's role. This
vision conceived a lawyer's first obligation to be the common good: the rule
of law and the protection of property rights. Once that duty was satisfied,
lawyers owed a duty of loyal and zealous representation to their clients.
Sharswood addressed much of his study of legal ethics to the task of bal-
ancing these sometimes competing adversarial and republican obligations. 6°
1. The Republican Role of Lawyers
Historians have traced the roots of republicanism to ancient Rome, 61
Renaissance Italy,62 and to English opposition thought.63 Professor William
Treanor has noted that "[a]t the center of republican thought lay a belief
in a common good and a conception of society as an organic whole. The
state's proper role consisted in large part of fostering virtue, of making the
individual unselfishly devote himself to the common good." 64 According to
56. MILLER, supra note 50, at 104, 187 (describing "old Puritan hostility to lawyers as being men
sworn to advocate any case regardless of its merits").
57. MILLER, supra note 50, at 100-04.
58. MILLER, supra note 50, at 102-04; Nash, supra note 47, at 210-14.
59. MILLER, supra note 50, at 187 (stating that under the influence of "revivalist morality" the
"inevitable accusation arose: lawyers ... by the very nature of their calling ... are dishonest. They are
committed to vindicating their client regardless of the merits of his cause, to making the worse appear
the better case").
60. His strong commitment to adversarial obligations distinguished him from David Hoffman, whose
resolutions were the only major American guidelines for legal ethics prior to Sharswood's Essay. See
Bloomfield, Hoffman, supra note 40, at 687. Indeed, Professors Bloomfield and Shaffer have incorrectly
argued that Sharswood's commitment to adversarial ethics led him to neglect republican obligations.
See note 40 supra.
61. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 24-93
(1967) and GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 46-90 (1969)
[hereinafter WOOD, CREATION].
62. J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment Revisited: A Study in History and Ideology, 53 J.
MOD. HIST. 49 (1981).
63. BAILYN, supra note 61, at 35.
64. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 699 (1985) [hereinafter Treanor, Origins]. See
WOOD, CREATION, supra note 61, at 53; WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 53, at 104-05.
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what most historians consider the dominant ideological force behind the
American Revolution,65 individuals had little to fear from republican gov-
ernment which emphasized the right of the people to participate in the
political system.66 The legislature, "[a]s the voice of the people, . . .could
be trusted to perceive the common good and to define the limits of individ-
ual rights. 67
Traditional republican thought saw in commerce and the attendant pur-
suit of self-interest a threat to proper governance and to virtue.6 Persons
"involved in the marketplace were usually overwhelmed by their [self-]in-
terests and were incapable of [the] disinterestedness" necessary to virtue
and realization of the common good. 69 Moreover, "[w]ealth encouraged
greed in its possessors and enabled them to wield undue power."70
In the wake of the American Revolution, influential republican thinkers
came to reconsider this view, accepting and in some cases even welcoming
the role of wealth and commerce in society. Professor Gordon Wood has
observed that many republicans conceded "that private interest ruled most
social relationships ... [and that] to expect most people to sacrifice their
private interests for the sake of the public good was utopian."'" In the eco-
nomic sphere, some republicans adopted theories that recognized both the
inevitability and the legitimacy of self-interest. 7 For example, a leading
historian has brought forth James Madison's argument that "republican
governments must protect the rights of property, as well as of persons" in
part to encourage industry with the incentive of potential wealth.7
Despite this shift, thinkers like Madison remained distinctly republican
because they did not give up hope for "virtuous politics" predicated on the
65. For discussions of the relevant historical literature, see, e.g., Gordon Wood, Hellfire Politics, N.
Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 28, 1985 at 28; Robert Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Histori-
ography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 334, 334-37 (1982).
66. WOOD, CREATION, supra note 61, at 61-63.
67. Id. at 134.
68. DREW R. McCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA
67-70 (1980); Treanor, Origins, supra note 64, at 699-70; WOOD, CREATION, supra note 61, at 88-89,
413-25; WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 53, at 104-06.
69. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 53, at 106.
70. Treanor, Origins, supra note 64, at 699.
71. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 53, at 252-53.
72. William Michael Treanor, Taking the Framers Seriously, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1035-1037
(1988) (reviewing WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY (1987)).
73. DREw R. McCoY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON & THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY
193-94 (1989). Professors McCoy and Wood view Madison as a republican. See supra; see WOOD,
RADICALISM, supra note 53, at 253. However, many other professors consider Madison to be a liberal.
See Treanor, Origins, supra note 64, at 709 n.85; see Joyce Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New
Contexts, 43 WM & MARY Q. 20 (1986). This difference probably occurs because, like many of his
contemporaries, Madison's approach included both republican and liberal elements. See JENNIFER
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 170-83 (1990).
1992]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
existence of a common good. 74 Even in this, however, there was significant
change. Professor Jennifer Nedelsky demonstrates that republicans instead
narrowed and altered their view of the scope of government's role. 75 For
some republicans the government, rather than promote the virtue of the
community, would provide "the preconditions for individuals' capacity to
lead the good life ... *"76 Others, like Madison, "did not treat character as
a basic object of government. ' 7  They defined the substantive role of gov-
ernment in language "not that of the classical republicans, but of modern
liberals. The task of government was to provide security, justice, prosperity
and liberty. 78
Having lost faith in the people's capacity for virtue, these modified
republicans viewed the duty of governance as the role of a virtuous elite. 79
Two groups would provide much of this leadership. The first was "disinter-
ested gentry who were supported by proprietary wealth and not involved in
the interest-mongering of the market place."80 The second was "lawyers
and other professionals [who] are somehow free of the marketplace, are
less selfish and interested and therefore better equipped for political leader-
ship and disinterested decision-making than merchants and businessmen."'"
Accompanying this shift to faith in elites and away from majoritarian
processes was a break with traditional republican stress on the centrality of
deliberation. 82
In the structure of government, the ultimate protection against majority
interference with the rights necessary to achieve virtue would be the judici-
ary and the legal system.83 Professor Gordon Wood has noted that one ma-
jor way of protecting liberty was to remove issues "such as property and
contract rights . . . from popular tampering [by defining them as] 'fixed
74. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 53, at 253.
75. NEDELSKY, supra note 73, at 182.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 179.
78. Id. A-leading commentator has, however, observed a similar eighteenth century republican defi-
nition of the common good as "consisting of protection for rights and liberties ...... Frank 1.
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, Foreword. Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L
REV. 4, 49 (1986).
79. NEDELSKY, supra note 73, at 181.
80. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 53, at 253.
81. Id. at 254 (discussing THE FEDERALIST No. 35 (Alexander Hamilton)). See also Robert W.
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, Indepen-
dence] (discussing the idea that lawyers possessed an independent, neutral position in society which
enabled them to balance the position of the wealthy at one extreme, and the position of the common
people at the other extreme).
82. See Isaac Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion". The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45
WM. & MARY Q. 3," 22-23 (1988).
83. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 53, at 324.
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principles of law to be determined by judges.'-84
In the context of this modified republicanism, Professor Robert Gordon
has described what he calls the "traditional 'republican ideal' " of the law-
yers' role.85 In this ideal, lawyers possess the independence from faction
necessary for virtue in addition to a counter-majoritarian obligation to pro-
tect property and other rights . 6 Last, they have a responsibility "to serve
as a policy intelligentsia ... and to use the authority and influence deriving
from their public prominence and professional skill to create and dissemi-
nate, both within and without the context of advising clients, a culture of
respect for and compliance with the purposes of the laws." 87
Professor Gordon's description of the republican lawyer's role accords
with Alexis de Tocqueville's famous observations. Although not a republi-
can, Tocqueville in Democracy in America described lawyers as the leaders
of American government. 8 Lawyers protected the seemingly contradictory
interests of democratic institutions and property interests.8 9 While lawyers'
work drew them toward the interests of property and order,90 Tocqueville
wrote, "their disproportionate influence results from the existence of demo-
cratic, rather than aristocratic or oligarchic, governance." 9' Similar to Pro-
fessor Gordon's description of the republican tradition of lawyering, Toc-
queville observed that lawyers used democratic institutions, especially the
jury system, to promote public acceptance of counter-majoritarian values.9
84. Id.
85. Gordon, Independence, supra note 81, at 14.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. ALExIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J. P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence
trans., 1969).
89. De Tocqueville observes that lawyers' "tastes naturally draw lawyers toward the aristocracy and
the prince and their interest as naturally pulls them toward the people." Id. at 266.
90. Tocqueville notes that:
[t]he exercise of their profession daily reminds them of this superiority; they are the masters
of a necessary and not widely understood science; they serve as arbiters between the citizens;
and the habit of directing the blind passions of the litigants toward the objective gives them a
certain scorn for the judgment of the crowd.
Id. at 264.
91. Their very status as aristocrats by merit and not by birth resulted from the existence of demo-
cratic institutions. "In America," Tocqueville observed, "there are neither nobles nor men of letters,
and the people distrust the wealthy. Therefore, the lawyers form the political upper class and the most
intellectual section of society." Id. at 268.
92. Tocqueville noted that:
[t]here is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn
into a judicial one .... As most public men are or have been lawyers, they apply their legal
habits and turn of mind to the conduct of affairs. Juries make all classes familiar with this.
So legal language is pretty well adopted into common speech; the spirit of the law . . .
infiltrates through society right down to the lowest ranks, till finally the whole people con-
tracted some of the ways and tastes of a magistrate.
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The role that Gordon and Tocqueville describe encompasses Sharswood's
vision of the role of the lawyer. More broadly, Sharswood's vision is consis-
tent with the modified republicanism that historians have found to be influ-
ential in the post-revolutionary era.
. While Sharswood did not use the term "republicanism," he did expressly
discuss the Roman Republic, which embodied the principle of republican-
ism. 93 Sharswood's view of government accords with Professor Nedelsky's
description of the republican perspective that "government would provide
the precondition for individuals' capacity to lead the good life . . o94 Shar-
swood wrote that government exists to provide the liberal objective of "se-
curity of life, liberty and property . . ."95 With this security, an individual
could pursue the republican objective of "perfection of ... physical, intel-
lectual, and moral powers, in order to give the fullest return to the labor of
his hands, and to secure the greatest advantages in knowledge and
wisdom." 96
Government promoted these ends through legislation " 'advancing or se-
curing the general good' "91 and through "the impartial administration of
equal and just laws." 98 Threats to governmental protection of order, liberty,
and property come from persons who seek to promote their interests at the
expense of the rights and interests of others. The threat to properity rights
was greater than to liberty. The rights of "[p]ersonal liberty, trial by jury,
the elective and other political franchises, liberty of conscience, of speech
and of the press, are able to protect themselves in a great measure from
their own democratic affinities." 99 Property, which often benefitted the few
rather than the majority, would not benefit from such "democratic affini-
ties," and therefore had "an especial claim to protection against the gov-
ernment itself."' 100 Indeed, through judicial review, property rights were
protected from the "power of majorities."'101
In Sharswood's vision of the lawyer's role, much as Professor Gordon
describes the republican model of lawyering, lawyers provided the enlight-
ened political leadership that protected "life, liberty, and property." Shar-
swood observed that "more frequently than from any other profession,
Id. at 270.
93. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 137-42.
94. See NEDELSKY, supra note 73, at 182.
95. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 53.
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id. at 15.
98. Id. at 20.
99. Id. at 35.
100. Id. at 21.
101. Id. at 31.
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[lawyers] fill the highest public stations,"102 including dominance of the
legislative process, 03 and exclusive administration of the judicial system as
-advocates and judges. 10 4 Lawyers were experts schooled in the science of
law and capable of impartial, or in classic republican terms "virtuous" leg-
islation and jurisprudence. °5
Sharswood provided illustrations of the lawyer's duty to society. Lawyers
were to secure "[t]he obligation of contracts" and restrict "the right of
eminent domain . . . by the provision for compensation."' 16 Protection of
contract and property rights also required clear, predictable rules, the
achievement of which required vigilant defense of stare decisis and prohibi-
tion of retroactive legislation. 07 Judicial respect for precedent and legisla-
tive avoidance of class legislation were necessary to impartial govern-
ance. 08 To limit interference with liberty, the taking of property through
taxation should be limited to the extent necessary to protect life, liberty,
and property. 09
Protecting property by influencing judicial and legislative processes was
only part of the obligation of Sharswood's ethical lawyer. Similar to the
observations of Professor Gordon and of Tocqueville, Sharswood suggested
that lawyers had a duty to secure popular acceptance of the lawyers'
102. Id. at 26; see also id. at 54.
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id. at 30-31.
105. Id. at 25-31, 52-53.
106. Id. at 35.
107. Id. at 40-41, 52-53. Sharswood noted that rejection of stare decisis results in the evil of judicial
legislation. Judicial laws create uncertainty and confusion. Id. at 52-53. Judicial laws:
are always retrospective, but worse on many accounts than retrospective statutes. Against
the latter we have at least the security of the constitutional provision that prohibits [ex post
facto legislation and impairment of contracts.] There is no such constitutional provision
against judicial legislation. It sweeps away a man's rights, vested, as he had reason to think,
upon the firmest foundation, without affording him the shadow of redress .... When a court
overrules a previous decision, it does not simply repeal it; it must pronounce it never to have
been law.
Id. at 45.
108. Sharswood asserted that class legislation, such as altering the standard of value in the interest
of the debtor class, is unequal and unjust, and leads to speculation, luxury, boom, and bust. Id. at 19-
21. A similar problem results from retrospective legislation. For a lawyer to seek retrospective legisla-
tion on behalf of a client was "a flagrant case of professional infidelity and misconduct." Id. at 25.
109. Id. Sharswood further states that:
[o]ne grievous invasion of property . . . is . . . taxation for objects not necessary for the
common defence and general welfare. Men have a right not only to be well governed, but to
be cheaply governed .... To compel men to contribute of the earnings or accumulations of
industry, their own or inherited, to objects beyond this, not within the legitimate sphere of
legislation, to appropriate the money in the public treasury to such objects, is a perversion
and abuse of the powers of government, little if anything short of legalized robbery.
Id. at 21-22.
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counter-majoritarian values. In this effort, Sharswood's own language illus-
trated how the language of democracy and equality could be used to de-
fend counter-majoritarian values. Sharswood argued that a legal system
that respected order and property would provide equal justice under law,110
and would protect the widow and orphan as well as the business person."'
The legal profession, in its republican role, "counsel[ed] the ignorant, de-
fend[ed] the weak and oppressed, and ... [stood] forth on all occasions as
the bulwark of private rights against the assaults of power."' 1 2
Employing this democratic language, the legal profession sought to gain
the confidence of and "to diffuse sound principles among the people.""' 3
The profession did so in providing counsel to clients, making arguments in
court to judge and jury, and through publications. 14 Lawyers succeeded in
this effort because of their pervasive role in government which "comes
home so nearly to every man's fireside.""' 5
2. The Lawyers' Adversarial Role
After describing lawyers as republican public servants, Sharswood's es-
say then explained their adversarial role. Sharswood discussed why an ad-
versarial system was necessary and whether this type of system would re-
sult in lawyers aiding injustice by arguing for the "wrong side.""' 6
Sharswood defended the adversarial system as the best, though imperfect,
method of deciding disputes. In this type of system, a neutral judge and
jury decided issues of law and fact after full presentation of evidence and
arguments by adversary parties." 7 For this system to work, the advocate
who presented the party's case must present it as well as possible and was
"not morally responsible" for the party." 8 If lawyers as advocates had full
moral responsibility for their clients, "they would usurp[] the functions of
both judge and jury. 11 9
Sharswood also explained why professional advocates were necessary. A
complex system of law required expertise, as did presentation of a case in
court and parties were not likely to possess this expertise. 20 Moreover, the
110. Id. at 30.
111. Id. at 53.
112. Id. at 53-54.
113. Id. at 54, 30.
114. Id. at 30-31.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 81-82.
117. Id. at 83-84.
118. Id.
119, Id. at 84.
120. Id. at 83-84. Referring to the Athenian and Roman republics, Sharswood observed that "[i]n
all countries advanced in civilization, and whose laws and manners have attained any degree of refine-
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same complexity that made the profession of law a practical necessity also
required the profession as a guarantor of relative equality between the par-
ties. 12' Without counsel, "there would be a very great inequality between
[parties], according to their intelligence, education and experience,
respectively." 22
3. Balancing the Republican and Adversarial Roles
Sharswood reconciled the lawyer's republican and adversarial roles by
creating an ethical system which valued both. His attempt to resolve "the
limits of [the lawyer's] duty when the legal demands or interests of [the]
client conflict with his own sense of what is just and right .. .,,12 focused
on the tension between these roles. Sharswood acknowledged that no con-
flict existed for proponents of the adversarial view that "all causes are to be
taken by [a lawyer] indiscriminately, and conducted with a view to one
single end, success," which he described as the "prevailing tone of profes-
sional ethics." 124 Indeed he noted that this ethic had been eloquently de-
scribed by Lord Brougham "in his justly celebrated defence of the Queen,"
when he asserted that " '[a]n advocate ...in the discharge of his duty
knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client."' 125
Lord Brougham proposed that the lawyer's first and only duty was "[t]o
save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs
to other persons, and among them to himself."' 12 6 The lawyer should not
consider the implications of actions for third parties, even if it causes
"alarm ... torments, [and] destruction."' 127 Lord Brougham noted that the
lawyer must even "[s]eparat[e] the duty of a patriot from that of an advo-
cate," and represent the client zealously even if it would put the "country
in confusion."' 28
While a strong defender of the adversarial system in principle, 2 9 Shar-
swood rejected Brougham's approach. Sharswood acknowledged that the
successful functioning of an adversarial system required the legal profes-
sion to provide access to the courts for all. However, in light of the lawyer's
ment, there has arisen an order of advocates devoted to prosecuting or defending the lawsuits of
others." Id. at 136-37.
121. Id. at 95.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 81.
124. Id. at 84.
125. Id. at 87. See discussion of Lord Brougham supra text accompanying note 42.
126. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 87.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Sharswood, supra note 3, at 82-84 ("The party has a right to have his case decided upon
the law and the evidence, and to have every view presented to the minds of the judges.").
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republican role, such an adversarial system could not require each individ-
ual lawyer to represent any client and to seek the greatest success for every
client represented. 30 Accordingly, Sharswood endorsed Pennsylvania Chief
Justice Gibson's repudiation of the "'popular but gross mistake . . . to
suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity to anyone except his client .. ' "131
Justice Gibson urged the contrary view that the lawyer was a public officer
with duties to the public"' and the court'33 as well as the client. He ob-
served that " '[t]he high and honorable office of a counsel would be de-
graded to that of a mercenary were [the lawyer] compelled to do the bid-
dings of his client against the dictates of his conscience.' 14
At the same time, Sharswood rejected the idea that lawyers should only
argue just causes. He recounted the story of Sir Matthew Hale, who at-
tempted this non-adversarial approach. Hale advised clients that he would
not assist them further if he determined that their "cause was unjust" and
that they should settle their case if it was weak. According to Sharswood,
however, Hale changed his views when he discovered that two cases which
"by ignorance of the party or their attorney" seemed bad cases "at first,"
were "very good and just" after further inquiry. 3
Sharswood recognized that the attempt to balance the sometimes con-
flicting republican and adversarial roles was "delicate and dangerous
ground" where "it [would] often be hazardous to condemn either client or
counsel upon what appears only."' 36 This effort to balance the lawyer's re-
publican and adversarial roles became the focus of Sharswood's effort to
create ethical standards to guide lawyers' conduct which was to become the
foundation for the modern legal ethics codes.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL ETHICS CODES FROM
SHARSWOOD TO THE CANONS AND LATER CODIFICATIONS
Sharswood's effort to resolve the lawyer's adversarial and republican du-
ties resulted in his prescription of broad standards for lawyers. Republican
130. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 90.
131. Id. at 96-97 (quoting Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845)).
132. Sharswood wrote that the lawyer is
the incumbent of an office-an office in the administration of justice-held by authority from
those who represent in her tribunals the majesty of the commonwealth, a majesty truly more
august than that of kings or emperors. It is an office, too, clothed with many privi-
leges-privileges, some of which are conceded to no other class or profession.
Id. at 58-59 (footnotes omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 97 (quoting Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845)).
135. Id. at 88 (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at 89.
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lawyers would not need many detailed or binding rules. Sharswood's essay
provided all the necessary guidance on the scope and content of the law-
yer's adversarial and republican duties, as well as instruction on how to
resolve potential conflicts between those duties.
The 1908 Canons largely borrow text and standards from Sharswood,
and the Code and the Rules continue the substance of the Canons.137 These
codifications, by virtue of borrowing Sharswood's text, incorporate his theo-
retical perspective. While the modern codes, unlike Sharswood, do not spell
out obligations to protect property and otherwise limit lawful zealous repre-
sentation, they continue the republican vision by maintaining Sharswood's
hierarchy of duties and by affording lawyers broad discretion to permit the
exercise of conscience in client representation. At the same time, however,
the codes retreat from the republican perspective in form and enforcement
provisions by moving from Sharswood's hortatory norms to legally binding
rules.
A. SHARSWOOD'S ESSAY
Sharswood's republican vision of lawyering influenced both the form and
content of his ethical standards. In the context of republican lawyers, broad
guidelines sufficed to ensure ethical standards. Moreover, the content of the
standards reflected a strong commitment to the lawyer's adversarial duties
which yielded only to the higher republican duties.
1. Form and Enforcement
Underlying Sharswood's reliance on broad guidelines was his republican
confidence that most lawyers were capable of virtue, and would act virtu-
ously if they understood how to do so. Like a member of the clergy, 38 a
lawyer should follow "[h]igh moral principle [as] his only safe guide; the
only torch to light his way amidst darkness and obstruction."'3 While
suited to pursue high moral virtue, such a vague aspiration failed to pro-
vide adequate guidance to practitioners facing conflicting republican and
adversarial duties. 40 Sharswood therefore offered "some accurate and in-
telligible rules by which to guide and govern the conduct of professional
life,"' 14 including assisting the lawyer "in coming to a safe conclusion in
foro conscientiae [in the forum of conscience], in the discharge of profes-
137. See discussion supra Part II.A.
138. Id. at 55.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 56.
141. Id.
1992] 259
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 6:241
sional duty."' 142 Not only would most lawyers follow these standards, but
the generally high standards of lawyers would result in the market, to-
gether with the legal community, reinforcing high ethical standards. 143
Sharswood relied on this theme throughout his essay. 14
Sharswood's model of behavior in the legal community and the market
assumed the presence of shared values in the legal profession. Only a com-
munity bound by similar values would consistently reward ethical conduct
and penalize unethical conduct. Sharswood expressed his belief in the high
ethical standards of the bar when he wrote that "no man can ever be a
truly great lawyer, who is not in every sense of the word, a good man."'' 5
The model also assumed that lawyers are experts to whom consumers
defer in evaluating legal services. As Sharswood observed, "[s]ooner or
later, the real public-the business men of the community, who have im-
portant lawsuits, and are valuable clients-endorse the estimate of a man
entertained by his associates of the Bar, unless indeed there be some glar-
ing defect of popular qualities."'' 46 Similarly, Sharswood described how a
young attorney could build a law practice through ethical conduct. 47
Sharswood's model further assumed a small community of lawyers and
clients who had frequent contact with each other.4 8 This regular contact
was necessary for lawyers to be able to appraise the character and compe-
tence of their colleagues. 149 Similarly, clients required frequent contact
142. Id. at 90.
143. In contrast, modern commentators often complain that market forces undermine lawyers' eth-
ics. See, e.g., Robert McKay, The Rise of the Justice Industry and the Decline of Legal Ethics, 68
WASH. U.LQ. 829 (1990).
144. Examples include his discussion of courtesy and candor to the court (Sharswood, supra note 3,
at 64, 72-73), courtesy and candor to the bar (id. at 73), and courtesy to witnesses (id. at 119-20).
Indeed, he suggested that the market may work better in the legal profession than it does generally in
other professions: "Among merchants, so many honest men become involved through misfortune, that
the rogue may hope to take shelter in the crowd, and be screened from observation. Not so the lawyer.
If he continues to seek business, he must find his employment in lower and still lower grades." Id. at
170-71.
145. Id. at 168.
146. Id. at 75.
147. (Llet business seek the young attorney; and though it may come in slowly, and at inter-
vals, and promise in its character neither fame nor profit, still, if he bears in mind that it is
an important part of his training that he should understand the business he does thoroughly,
that he should especially cultivate, in transacting it, habits of neatness, accuracy, punctual-
ity, and despatch, candor towards his client, and strict honor towards his adversary, it may
be safely prophesied that his business will grow as fast as it is good for him that it should
grow. ...
Id. at 131-32.
148. For a modern discussion of the advantages of "repeat players" in the legal system, see Marc
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 95 (1974).
149. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 73-76.
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with lawyers to learn their perspectives and to gain confidence in their
judgment. 150
Under this model, with lawyers capable of achieving virtue, and conse-
quently with the legal community and the market reinforcing ethical stan-
dards, an essay like Sharswood's, which explained ethical standards, would
by and large suffice to encourage compliance with those standards over the
long term. Only where a single ethical violation was so egregious that it
threatened the legitimacy of the system would it be necessary to impose the
disciplinary sanction of suspension or disbarment. 5'
2. The Content of Sharswood's Code
Sharswood's ethical guidelines balanced adversarial and republican obli-
gations. The adversarial duty required zealous representation. The republi-
can duty, however, required that zealous representation yield when it con-
flicted with the lawyer's duty as a republican guardian of the law.
a. Adversarial Duties
Sharswood viewed the lawyer's obligation to the client as "immovable
fidelity."' Although the lawyer's legal obligation was "ordinary care and
ordinary skill"' 53 the lawyer's "moral responsibility [was e]ntire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defence of his
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability."'15 4 In detailing
duties arising from fidelity to the client, Sharswood recognized ethical stan-
dards which fall within the duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and compe-
tence which comprise much of the modern ethics of lawyering.
The duty of loyalty prohibited conflicts. Sharswood instructed that the
lawyer may not "tak[e] fees of two adversaries."' 55 At time of retainer, the
lawyer must disclose potential conflicts with both current and former cli-
ents.'56 Loyalty also required the lawyer to avoid conflicts with the lawyer's
own interests that could arise from business transactions with clients, even
150. See id. at 75.
151. An example of an ethical violation warranting the imposition of suspension or disbarment is ex
parte contact with jurors. Id. at 67-68.
152. Id. at 117. "Immovable fidelity" is defined as the lawyer's complete identification with the
client. Id.
153. Id. at 76.
154. Id. at 77-80. This language is quoted in the Canons. See supra note 19.
155. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 117.
156. Such conflicts included "every circumstance of his own connection with the parties or prior
relation to the controversy" as well as "every adverse retainer, and even every prior retainer." Id. at
109-10. Absent disclosure, a client had a right to presume that no conflicts existed. Id.
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when unrelated to the representation, 57 as well as from contingent fee ar-
rangements which in effect made lawyers and clients business partners.'58
The duty of loyalty implicated other fiduciary duties. These included
safeguarding client funds,'59 and candor in advising the client of the law-
yer's view of the merits and likely outcome. 160
A related and special duty of loyalty was the duty of confidentiality.
Sharswood phrased the duty in terms of the privilege.' 61 Sharswood wrote
that the attorney-client privilege required that the lawyer keep the client's
confidences, 162 even if the lawyer learned of the criminal defendant's
guilt 163 or of facts damaging to his client's civil case. 64
In addition to loyalty and confidentiality, Sharswood prescribed a duty of
competence. Competence had a number of components, including thorough
preparation, 65 punctuality, 166 attention to detail, 67 and continuing educa-
tion, especially for young lawyers, in law 168 and liberal arts. 69
b. Republican Duties
Sharswood prescribed republican duties which were both independent of,
and conflicting with, adversarial duties. Independent of adversarial obliga-
tions was the duty to the impartial administration of justice. This is the
obligation that is described today as a pro bono obligation. In criminal
157. Sharswood noted that "[a]ll transactions of business between attorney and client are looked
upon with eyes of suspicion and disfavor, in courts of justice." Id. at 164-65. For similar reasons, a
lawyer should accept no gifts during the representation or compensation greater than the agreed
amount. Id. at 165.
158. Id. at 160-62.
159. Id. at 166.
160. Id. at 107-08.
161. Although modern commentators distinguish between the attorney-client privilege and the duty
of confidentiality, see, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. AND SUSAN KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 185-86 (1990), the use of the privilege as a way of referring to confidentiality persisted at
least as recently as the Model Code. See MODEL CODE DR 4-101 (stating that the duty of confidential-
ity applies to information protected by attorney-client privilege in addition to client "secrets").
162. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 106-07.
163. Id. at 105-07.
164. Id. at 84-85.
165. Id. at 120-21.
166. Id. at 123.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 125-29.
169. Of lawyers who restrict themselves to legal reading, Sharswood observed:
There is great danger that law reading, pursued to the exclusion of everything else, will
cramp and dwarf the mind, shackle it by the technicalities with which it has become so
familiar, and disable it from taking enlarged and comprehensive views, even of topics falling
within its compass, as well as of those lying beyond its legitimate domain.
Id. at 133.
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cases, ethical lawyers should not refuse court assignment to represent indi-
gent defendants. 170 In civil matters, a lawyer had a duty to represent the.
poor for little or no fee. 7 ' Sharswood conceived "that the time will never
come ...when a poor man with an honest cause, though without a fee,
cannot obtain the services of honorable counsel, in the prosecution or de-
fence of his rights."'17
Other republican duties related to compensation from clients. While
Sharswood acknowledged that the law generally permitted attorneys to sue
clients for fees, he urged lawyers to refrain from such suits because they
encouraged lawyers' unethical, money seeking impulses and undermined
the legal community's public image. 3 In addition to the objection to con-
tingent fees from the perspective of the duty of loyalty, Sharswood argued
that they both "reduc[ed the lawyer] from his high position of an officer of
the court and a minister of justice, to that of a party litigating his own
claim"' 7 4 and unduly encouraged litigation. 75
Limiting the lawyer's adversarial duties were republican duties circum-
scribing both the choice of client and the choice of strategy in representing
a client. A legal ethic based exclusively on the ethics of the advocacy role
in the adversarial system would suggest that a lawyer represent all persons
who need representation without regard to the lawyer's evaluation of the
merits of the party's case. Indeed, the English barristers adopted this ap-
proach in using an ethical standard of first come, first served in choosing
clients. 76 Sharswood rejected this model because the decision as to whether
to represent a client implicated a lawyer's independent moral judgment. In
Sharswood's view, a lawyer violated ethical duties when "consciously
press[ing] for an unjust judgment, much more so when he presses for the
conviction of an innocent man."' 77 A lawyer should not take cases indis-
criminately and success should not be the lawyer's only goal when deter-
mining whether to accept a case. 7
Even after the lawyer decided to represent a client, republican duties to
170. Id. at 91 (footnote omitted).
171. Id. at 151.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 147-52.
174. Id. at 160.
175. Id. at 161. Sharswood recognized an exception for "rates of commission to be charged for the
collection of undefended claims," id. at 153, apparently because they served a necessary role in protect-
ing property rights. Id.
176. Robert S. Alexander, The History of the Law as an Independent Profession and the Present
English System, in THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE 14 (ABA Tort and Insurance Prac-
tice Section 1984); see also MELLINKOFF, supra note 42, at 164.
177. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 97-98 (quoting Chief Justice Gibson in Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa.
187, 189 (1845)).
178. Id. at 84.
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the law and the legal system tempered zealous representation. Duties to the
client were required to yield to duties to the court and the bar. A judicial
system that was impartial and also had the confidence of the public was
essential to the rule of law. Despite potential benefits to the client, lawyers
had a duty to treat courts and judges with respect, even when opposed to
"the views expressed or the course pursued by the court," 179 and to refrain
from appealing to jurors to "disregard" the judge's legal directives. 80 Simi-
larly, the duty of fairness and honesty to the court bounded advocacy on
behalf of the client,' 8 ' as did prohibitions on ex parte contacts with judges
and juries.'8 2
Also limiting advocacy were duties to the bar. Courtesy to fellow lawyers
was both a matter of decency and a necessary condition for lawyers to
function as a cooperative community of political leaders with shared values.
Therefore, despite potential advantages for the client, a lawyer should keep
promises to other lawyers "faithfully and liberally,"' 83 and avoid mislead-
ing 84 or surprising" an opponent. Even despite client instructions to the
contrary, a lawyer should "be liberal to the slips and oversights of his oppo-
nent wherever he can do so. .... 11116
Beyond these particular duties to the bar and the court, the republican
lawyer had a duty to virtue or "conscience" that limited the bounds of
permissible advocacy. 8 7 The primary duty of an attorney for the prosecu-
tion or a civil plaintiff was, like that of a judge, to follow the lawyer's sense
of justice even to the extent of refusing to pursue lawful but immoral goals
and even when the civil plaintiff would thereby be denied representation by
counsel. 88
179. Id. at 62-63.
180. Id. at 69-71.
181. Id. at 72. A further illustration of the extent of the lawyer's duty of honesty to the court is the
limit Sharswood imposes on the preparation of affidavits. An ethical lawyer should ask for the client's
version of the facts without suggesting which answers would make the best case under the law. Id. at
111-12.
182. Id. at 66.
183. Id. at 73.
184. Id.
185. The lawyer who "sits down deliberately to plot a surprise upon his opponent ... deserves to fall,
and in all probability will fall, into the trap which his own hands have laid .... If he should succeed,
he will have gained with his success not the admiration and esteem, but the distrust and dislike of one
of his associates as long as he lives." Id. at 73-74.
186. Where the client demanded that the lawyer "be illiberal. . . . he should throw up his brief
sooner than do what revolts against his own sense of what is demanded by honor and propriety." Id. at
74-75.
187. Id. at 110-11.
188. Id. at 93-94. Sharswood reconciled the unavailability of counsel with the vitality of the adver-
sarial system by arguing that even without a lawyer, the party could represent himself in court. Id. at
96.
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In contrast, adversarial principles played a much stronger role in guiding
the advocate for criminal or civil defendants. In Sharswood's view, the de-
fendant was a potential victim of the abuse of state authority while the
plaintiff was not.8 9 Nonetheless, in addition to the limits placed by duties
to the court and the bar, republican values still limited the level of advo-
cacy for criminal and civil defendants.
The role of counsel for a criminal defendant derived from the criminal
defendant's basic constitutional rights. Sharswood noted that even the
guilty have "a constitutional right to a trial according to law[,]' 190 the ben-
efit of counsel, and the presumption of innocence. 9' Even if the lawyer was
convinced of the client's guilt-for example, if the client confessed192-the
lawyer should "exert all his ability, learning, and ingenuity, in such a de-
fence .... "193
Paralleling his analogy between plaintiff's lawyer and prosecutor, Shar-
swood treated the defendant in a civil case as similar to the defendant in a
criminal case. The fundamental approach was that "[a] defendant has a
legal right to require that the plaintiff's demand against him should be
proved and proceeded with according to law."' 194
189. Many modern lawyers would disagree with Sharswood's distinction between defending against a
claim and vindicating a right, especially where plaintiffs are poor or are members of subordinated
groups. In these cases, they would argue that plaintiff representation is necessary to protect against the
abuse of state or corporate power. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public
Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 268-72 (1990) (describing perspectives of public interest lawyers); Lucie
E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wisc. L.
REV. 699, 754-766 (1988).
190. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 91.
191. Id. at 90-91.
192. Id. at 105.
193. Id. at 92. An ethic permitting a lawyer to refuse to defend the guilty would deprive defendants
of their constitutional right to a fair trial because "the effect would be to deprive a defendant, in such
cases,*of the benefit of counsel altogether." Id. at 96. Unlike Sharswood, David Hoffman urged that
lawyers limit their zealousness in representing certain criminals. His Resolution XV states that:
When employed to defend those charged with crimes of the deepest dye, and the evidence
against them, whether legal, or moral, be such as to leave no just doubt of their guilt, I shall
not hold myself privileged, much less obliged, to use my endeavors to arrest, or to impede the
course of justice, by special resorts to ingenuity .... Persons of atrocious character, who have
violated the laws of God and man, are entitled to no such special exertions from any member
of our pure and honourable profession; and indeed, to no intervention beyond securing to
them a fair and dispassionate investigation of the facts of their cause, and the due applica-
tion of the law: all that goes beyond this, either in manner or substance, is unprofessional...
Hoffman, Resolutions, supra note 39, at 755-56.
194. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 95. Sharswood argued that "if a suit be instituted against a man to
recover damages for a tort, the defendant has a right to all the ingenuity and eloquence he can com-
mand in his defence, that even if he has committed a wrong, the amount of the damages may not
exceed what the plaintiff is entitled to recover." Id. at 96. David Hoffman, in contrast, would not
pursue a defense (or claim) that he believed "cannot, or rather ought not, to be sustained .. " Hoff-
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However, even within the parameters of zealous advocacy for criminal
and civil defendants, Sharswood's guidelines suggested six limiting princi-
ples. The first three derived from the lawyer's independent moral responsi-
bility and applied to representation of both criminal and civil defendants.
First, the lawyer should not put his integrity at issue by expressing a per-
sonal opinion even when it was an honest one.'95 Second, the lawyer should
not sacrifice personal integrity by making arguments the lawyer knows are
contrary to the facts or law.196 Third, the virtuous lawyer must be respect-
ful to opposing parties and witnesses even if the client instructed the lawyer
to the contrary.'97
The fourth, fifth, and sixth principles appear only to have applied to rep-
resentation of civil defendants. Fourth, while zealous representation was
the goal for defense against an "unrighteous claim," defense against a
"righteous claim" should be limited to assuring the defendant "a fair trial
on the merits in open court."' 198 Fifth, as a steward of property rights, the
lawyer should refuse to pursue legal goals that frustrate legitimate property
rights, such as by helping a client use legal means to avoid the "just de-
mands of creditors."1 99 Sixth, with every client, the lawyer should seek to
persuade the client to pursue the result that is best for the legal system.200
man, Resolutions, supra note 39, at 754. For example, he would "never plead the Statute of Limita-
tions when based on the mere efflux of time .... " Id.
195. Sharswood, supra note 3, at 99-103.
196. Id. at 72, 99. To do otherwise would immorally sell the client " 'not only [the lawyer's] skill and
learning, but [the lawye'] himself.' " Id. at 101 (quoting Whewell's Elements of Moral and Political
Science). For example, if a client had confessed to a lawyer and the lawyer believed the confession, the
lawyer must represent the client zealously by raising doubts about the adequacy of the government's
proof but could not ethically suggest that another had committed the crime. Sharswood illustrated this
point with Charles Phillips's defense of Courvoisier for the murder of Lord William Russell. After
Phillips had suggested at the beginning of the trial that others might be guilty of the crime, Courvoisier
confessed to him. Phillips contemplated withdrawal. After consulting with the court, he continued in
the case and argued that the case against his client had not been proven. However, Phillips no longer
suggested guilt on the part of other parties because that might have brought "down an unjust suspicion
upon an innocent person" or resulted in his "falsely pretend[ing] a confidence in the truth and justice of
his cause, which he did not feel." Id. at 103-05.
197. Id. at 118-19.
198. Id. at 98-99.
199. Id. at 112. For example, with regard to "stay and exemption laws," Sharswood noted that "[ilt
is not every case in which a man has a legal that he has a moral right to claim the benefit of such
laws." ld, at 113. Sharswood urged that a lawyer should refuse to assist a debtor with "ample means to
pay" who seeks to harass the creditor or who "wishes to take advantage of hard times to make more
than legal interest, or with concealed means unknown to the execution plaintiff, claims the exemption..
." Id.
Sharswood further relied on the "Sermon on the Mount" in advising: "[C]onfine not yourself in your
transactions with your fellow-men to giving them simply the strict measure of their legal rights, give
them all that is honestly theirs as far as you have ability, whether the law affords them a remedy or
not." Id. at 114.
200. Id. at 109. Sharswood asserted that "[a] very important part of the advocate's duty is to moder-
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B. THE CANONS OF ETHICS
The Canons drew on Sharswood's republican vision for both form and
content. The very need for a formal code of ethics, however, represented a
retreat from Sharswood's faith in the virtue of lawyers and the legal
community.
1. Content of the Canons
The drafters of the Canons espoused a progressive vision of lawyers as
disinterested policy makers similar to Sharswood's republican perspec-
tive.20 1 They sought to use the Canons to reverse what they perceived as the
decline of law from its professional role to the status of a business.20 2 The
drafters liberally borrowed text and ideas from Sharswood's essay20 3 which
offered a way to achieve the republican objective while still accommodating
the lawyer's adversarial role.
Sharswood's republican perspective is present in the first words of the
Canons. The "Preamble" to the Canons describes how the administration
of justice, government of the United States, and indeed "[t]he future of the
Republic" depend upon the legal profession's "maintenance of Justice pure
and unsullied" through members whose "conduct and motives . . . merit
ate the passions of the party, and, where the case is of a character to justify it, to encourage an amica-
ble compromise of the controversy." Id.
201.
[High-minded lawyers were embarked on a practical program of reform. As leaders of the
bar, they belonged to a radiation, communicated through endless reiteration in formal
speeches, of patrician Whig aspirations to play a distinctive role in American society as a
Third Force in politics (in fact the role of "the few" in classical republican theory), mediat-
ing between capital and labor, between private acquisitiveness and democratic redistributive
follies; thus, they kept looking for social stages on which to enact the role of Tocqueville's
lawyer-aristocrats.
Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law". Fantasies and Practices of New York City
Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 56 (Ger-
ald W. Gawalt ed., 1984) [hereinafter Gordon, The Ideal]; see also Gordon, Independence, supra note
81, at 16-17 (explaining how the promotion of professional independence and legal ethics would result
in "trained disinterested professionals").
202. SEE Auerbach, supra note 38, at 34-35, 40-52; Gordon, The Ideal, supra note 201, at 61-62.
The stock manipulation scandals of the late nineteenth century, which often included allegations of
bribery of judges and jurors, sullied the reputation of even the bar's elite. Gordon, supra note 201, at
56-57. Many inside the profession feared it was devolving into uncritical service of business interests.
AUERBACH, supra note 38, at 34-35, 40-41; Gordon, supra note 201, at 61; Louis D. Brandeis, The
Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555, 558-59 (1905). At the same time, the number of personal
injury and immigrant lawyers, who the elite viewed with distaste, was increasing. AUERBACH, supra
note 38, at 40-53, 62-64; JULIUS HENRY COHEN. THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 181-83 (rev. ed.
1924).
203. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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the approval of all just men."2 °4
Similar republican language pervades the Canons. Canon 32, entitled
"The Lawyer's Duty in Its Last Analysis," sets forth the counter-
majoritarian obligation of loyalty to the law and the judicial system despite
the contrary urging of any "client, corporate or individual, however power-
ful, nor any cause, civil or political, however important ... ."101 The lawyer
"will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private
trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal
citizen."206
In delineating specific ethical obligations, the Canons place the highest
priority on the lawyer's duties to the legal system. Standards similar to
Sharswood's include prohibition of ex parte contacts with the court,20 7 pub-
lic support for the judiciary against "unjust criticism and clamor,"20 8 can-
dor and fairness in presentation of evidence and arguments to judge and
jury,209 and provision of counsel to the indigent prisoner.210
Even the Canons not directly drawn from Sharswood's essay implement
duties to the legal system. These include Canons establishing a duty to
pursue merit selection of judges2 1 and to refrain from trying cases in the
press212, as well as an obligation to expose unethical behavior before proper
tribunals.213 Another Canon established duties of fair treatment of unrepre-
sented parties and of refraining from communicating directly with parties
represented by counsel.21 4
Obligations to fellow lawyers are added to these duties to the legal sys-
tem. Like Sharswood, the Canons require lawyers to provide candor in
communicating with the court and their colleagues,215 to refrain from "tak-
ing technical advantage of opposite counsel,"21 6 and to grant "liberally"
requests for extensions and other technical requests, despite client instruc-
tions to the contrary. 217
Similarly, in governing the lawyer-client relationship, the Canons employ
Sharswood's republican approach of limiting client advocacy. The Canons
204. CANONS, supra note 7, at pmbl.
205. Id. at Canon 32.
206. Id.
207. Id. at Canon 3.
208. Id. at Canon 1.
209. Id. at Canons 22, 23.
210. Id. at Canon 4.
211. Id. at Canon 2.
212. Id. at Canon 20.
213. Id. at Canon 29.
214. Id. at Canon 9.
215. Id. at Canon 22.
216. Id. at Canon 25.
217. Id. at Canon 24.
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address the question of "How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Cli-
ent's Cause" and adopt Sharswood's instruction that "[tihe lawyer owes
'entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and abil-
ity . ..' "218 Like Sharswood, however, the Canons reject the notion that
"it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in
winning his client's cause."2 19
In determining the proper balance, the Canons adopt, for the most part,
Sharswood's approach. They urge that prosecutors should pursue justice
and that a lawyer for a criminal defendant should "by all fair and honora-
ble means ...present every defense that the law of the land permits,"220
language which appears to imply Sharswood's limiting principles.22 The
Canons further include his limiting principles prohibiting assertion of a
lawyer's personal belief, 222 requiring fair treatment of witnesses and oppo-
nents, 223 and preventing clients from engaging in improprieties with regard
to the court and the participants in the legal process. 224 The Canons
thereby limit lawyers' obligation to the client within the bounds of law to
avoid "any manner of fraud or chicane. ' ' 225 For civil litigation, the Canons
go further than Sharswood by binding a lawyer for a defendant, as well as
a plaintiff, from taking a case in order "to harass or to injure the opposite
party or to work oppression or wrong.
226
The Canons also make clear that, as in Sharswood's Essay, 227 the respon-
sibility for determining the moral bounds of advocacy rests with the law-
yer. Canon 31 expressly states that "[tlhe responsibility for advising as to
questionable transactions, for bringing questionable suits, for urging ques-
tionable defenses, is the lawyer's responsibility. He cannot escape it by urg-
ing as an excuse that he is only following his client's instructions. ' 28 Ca-
non 15 similarly concludes that a lawyer "must obey his own conscience
and not that of his client.12 29
Inside the bounds of advocacy, the Canons tend to follow, sometimes
with more or less specificity, Sharswood's duties of loyalty, confidentiality,
218. Id. at Canon 15 (quoting SHARSWOOD, supra note 3, at 78-79).
219. Id.
220. Id. at Canon 5.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 169-75.
222. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 15.
223. Id. at Canon 18.
224. Id. at Canon 16.
225. Id. at Canon 15.
226. Id. at Canon 30.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 169-82.
228. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 31.
229. Id. at Canon 15.
1992]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
and competence. In terms of loyalty, similar to Sharswood's essay,230 Ca-
non 6 prohibits both concurrent and subsequent conflicts. 231 Like Shar-
swood's instruction not to do business with a client, 232 Canon 10 forbids a
lawyer from "acquiring [an] interest in litigation. ' 233 Canon 11, following
Sharswood's more general warning about protecting client assets, 234 forbids
a lawyer from commingling client assets. 235 Canon 8 adopts Sharswood's
requirement of candor to the client. 236
The duties of confidentiality and competence, while acknowledged, are
less developed in the Canons. Of Sharswood's competence duties, 27 the Ca-
nons import only the obligations of punctuality 38 and thorough preparation
before offering legal advice. 39 Sharswood's exhortations of confidentiality 240
do not appear as a separate Canon. Confidentiality is, however, mentioned
in the Canon barring successor conflicts, 24' and does appear as the basis for
a separate Canon added in 1928.242
With regard to compensation, the Canons retain Sharswood's perspec-
tive 243 but are less restrictive. While disfavoring suits against clients, the
Canons permit such suits.244 Similarly, the Canons allow contingent fee
agreements but urge strict court scrutiny. 245
On balance, therefore, the Canons largely adopt Sharswood's ethical
standards, including his republican vision of the lawyer's role. Indeed, the
Canons continue, in part, Sharswood's republican confidence in the virtue
of the legal community by relying largely on general discretionary stan-
dards, rather than employing detailed instructions for ethical conduct.
2. Enforcement of the Canons
The enactment of the Canons constituted in part a rejection of Shar-
230. See supra text accompanying notes 184-90.
231. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 6.
232. See supra text accompanying note 187.
233. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 10.
234. See supra text accompanying note 188.
235. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 11.
236. Id. at Canon 8; see supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 194-98.
238. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 21.
239. Id. at Canon 8.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 191-93.
241. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 6.
242. Id. at Canon 37.
243. See discussion supra pages 30-33.
244. Suits against clients are permitted only in circumstances to "prevent injustice, imposition, or
fraud." CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 14; see supra note 24.
245. Where sanctioned by law, contingent fee arrangements should be scrutinized to protect clients
from "unjust charges." CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 13; see supra note 24.
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swood's view that an essay on ethical standards, reinforced by the legal
community and the market, would .suffice to obtain compliance with high
ethical standards. Indeed, the experience of increased commercialization
and scandal in the bar since the publication of Sharswood's essay246 indi-
cated the limited success of his approach. Moreover, the growth in size and
diversity of both the lawyer and client populations reduced the likelihood
that adversaries or clients would be repeat players as Sharswood's model
had assumed. 247
Much in the same way that modified republicans located virtue in a pro-
fessional elite in response to loss of faith in the virtue of the populace,
2 48
the Canons located responsibility for ethical standards in the legal elite in
response to a loss of faith in the larger legal community. 249 Professor
Auerbach suggests that the Canons were part of an effort of prominent
lawyers to "use[] bar associations as a lever of control over professional
ethics, educational qualifications, and bar admissions."250 The Canons were
both a reaffirmation of high ethical standards and a code against which to
measure the ethics of individual practitioners.25 The elite could use the
Canons to educate lawyers, to censure unethical conduct, and to seek judi-
cial and legislative action to penalize unethical acts. 252
In the last analysis, however, the Canons were "fraternal norms" with
"no direct legal effect either in grievance proceedings against lawyer mis-
conduct or in civil actions for legal malpractice." '253 The Canons did, how-
ever, serve courts as "guides to the ethical duties of lawyers 254 as part of a
developing "common law governing legal practice." 2"
While generally retreating from Sharswood's conception of self-enforcing
246. See supra note 216.
247. Professor Auerbach has suggested that Sharswood's "[e]mphasis on reputation as the key to
professional dignity and success ... presupposed the vanished homogenous community whose lawyers
were known, visible, and accessible .... In twentieth-century cities, ironically, these conditions flour-
ished only in the subculture inhabited by corporate law firms and their business clients." AUERBACH,
supra note 38, at 42.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
249. Specifically, elite members of the bar utilized standards of ethical conduct to condemn contin-
gent fee arrangements and ambulance chasing practices. AUERBACH, supra note 38, at 40-53.
250. Id. at 64. Moreover, Professor Auerbach notes that "[tihe ethical crusade that produced the
Canons concealed class and ethnic hostility," particularly against Jewish and Catholic lawyers of lower-
class origin, and served to stratify the profession. Id. at 50-51.
251. Two other developments increased the bar leadership's control of the profession. These were
"first, creation of the 'integrated bar,' a state-sponsored professional association under the aegis of the
courts to which all practicing lawyers were required to maintain membership[, and] second, intensified
disciplinary enforcement, including the sanctions of disbarment and suspension, which only the courts
could impose." Hazard, supra note 32, at 1250-51.
252. AUERBACH, supra note 38, at 44-52, 60-65; COHEN, supra note 202, at 155-56.
253. Hazard, supra note 34, at 1249-50.
254. Id. at 1254 n.77.
255. Id. at 1255 n.79.
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ethical standards, 5 6 the Canons did not reject them entirely. A republican
faith in the basic virtue of lawyers and the legal community made unneces-
sary either binding rules or detailed consumer protection regulations. In-
deed, Canon 27, which unlike Sharswood's essay, prohibits advertising, 27
echoes Sharswood's perspective on the value of ethical behavior. In its orig-
inal form, Canon 27 states that "[tihe most worthy and effective advertise-
ment possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust." '258
This language gives even greater weight than Sharswood's model to the
superior wisdom of republican lawyer experts in evaluating other lawyers.
Sharswood at least acknowledged that wealthy clients, who share high val-
ues, will make choices based on reputation in the bar.259 In the Canons, the
client market, although implied, has no visible role in enforcement.
C. SURVIVAL OF SHARSWOOD'S REPUBLICAN VISION IN THE MODEL CODE
AND THE MODEL RULES
The Model Code and the Model Rules move further away from the no-
tion that the legal community and market will enforce high ethical stan-
dards in the normal course of business. The Model Code, adopted in 1970,
introduces for the first time legally binding Disciplinary Rules in addition
to aspirational Ethical Considerations.60 The Model Rules, adopted in
1983, discard the Ethical Considerations for a format including only le-
gally binding standards.261
But while they repudiate the notion of self-enforcing standards, the
Model Code and the Model Rules do include many elements of a republi-
can vision. Both describe the legal profession as a governing class, indepen-
dent of outside control, with a counter-majoritarian duty to protect the rule
of law and to promote the impartial administration of justice.262 Both pre-
256. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
257. CANONS, supra note 7, at Canon 27.
258. Id.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
260. Hazard, supra note 34, at 1251, 1254.
261. Id. at 1254.
262. The Model Rules, for example, describe lawyers as a self-governing profession with an obliga-
tion to "seek improvement of the law [and] the administration of justice .. "MODEL RULES pmbl. The
Model Rules further instruct that "[a] lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for
those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty when
necessary to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process."
Id. The Model Rules also forbid lawyers from making false or reckless statements regarding judges
and urge lawyers "to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized."
MODEL RULES Rule 8.2(a) & cmt. See also MODEL RULES Rule 3.5 (prohibiting a lawyer from engag-
ing in improper influence upon a tribunal). But see Hazard, supra note 34, at 1264-65 (suggesting that
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scribe republican duties of candor to the court 263 and of courtesy and fair-
ness to fellow lawyers and to non-clients.
264
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules also pose a republican solu-
tion to Sharswood's question "what are the limits of [the lawyer's] duty
when the legal demands or interests of his client conflict with [the law-
yer's] own sense of what is just and right?" 265 The answer lies not with the
client but with the discretion and superior judgment of the lawyer or legal
profession. First, the lawyer need not take the case. 266 Second, if the lawyer
takes the case, the ethics codifications only require the lawyer to follow
client instructions regarding the decision to settle in a civil case and the
decisions whether to plead, waive a jury, or testify in a criminal case. 267
Hortatory language regarding deferring to client decisions on process ques-
tions with non-legal implications is offset by language leaving the final de-
termination to the lawyer or the standards of the legal profession. 26 Third,
Model Rules have moved away from Canon's message that lawyers must support and sustain the
courts).
The Model Code similarly states that "[l]awyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the
preservation of society," including "the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual
and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-government." MODEL CODE pmbl. The specific
provisions of the Model Code also mandate duties to the integrity of the legal system and respect for
the courts and the rule of law. See, e.g., MODEL CODE Canon I ("A Lawyer Should Assist in Main-
taining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession"); EC 7-1 (prescribing the duty of a
lawyer to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law where the duty is derived from his
membership in a profession having the duty to assist the public); Canon 8 ("A Lawyer Should Assist in
Improving the Legal System").
263. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3; MODEL CODE DR 7-102.
264. MODEL RULES Rules 3.4, 4.1-4.4; MODEL CODE DR 7-101(A)(1), DR 7-102(A), DR 7-
104(A), 'DR 7-106(C), DR 7-109.
265. SHARSWOOD, supra note 3, at 81.
266. Professor Wolfram has noted that "[t]he lawyer codes in this century have consistently taken
the position that, with two exceptions-unpopular clients in need of legal services and court appoint-
ments-every lawyer is free to accept or reject any client for reasons personal to the lawyer. WOLFRAM,
supra note 39, § 10.2.2, at 573. See MODEL RULES Rule 6.2 & cmt. (stating that a lawyer need not
accept a client or cause she regards as "repugnant"); MODEL CODE EC 2-26 (urging that a lawyer
should not "lightly decline proffered employment" where the objective is to "make legal services fully
available").
The suggestion that lawyers make themselves available to unpopular clients, however, is only horta-
tory rather than mandatory. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt.; MODEL RULES Rule 6.2 cmt.; MODEL CODE
EC 2-26. Moreover, the provisions regarding court appointment allow exceptions for "compelling rea-
sons" (MODEL CODE EC 2-29), or for "good cause" (MODEL RULES Rule 6.2 cmt.).
267. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a). Generally, the provisions of the Code are less clear. Model Code
DR 7-101 speaks of the client's "lawful objectives," and the hortatory language of EC 7-7 describes the
client's authority to decide in a civil case whether to "accept a settlement offer or ... waive [the] right
to plead an affirmative defense," and in a criminal case on whether to plead guilty or to appeal. The
Code does not, however, expressly provide the client with authority over a broad range of decisions.
WOLFRAM, supra note 39, § 4.3, at 157.
268. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt. (establishing "distinction between objectives and means," but
acknowledging difficulty of even making such distinction and noting "a lawyer is not required to pursue
objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do so"); MODEL CODE
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the legal ethics codes urge the lawyer to counsel the client on the moral as
well as legal implications of the representation.2 69 Fourth, except where ir-
reparable prejudice will result, a lawyer may generally withdraw from rep-
resenting a client who seeks a strategy or goal repugnant to the lawyer.270
In sum, despite language suggesting that the adversarial commitment is
primary, lawyers have broad freedom under the codes to exercise discretion
in client representation.
The form of the binding provisions of the Model Rules and the Model
Code is also consistent with Sharswood's republican faith in lawyers. The
use of relatively general statements of ethics enforced by the legal profes-
sion evidences a continued faith in the basic virtue of lawyers and the legal
DR 7-101 (B)(1)("[A] lawyer may ... [w]here permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive
or fail to assert a right or position of his client."); MODEL CODE EC 7-7 ("In certain areas of legal
representation not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a
lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is en-
tirely that of the client .... ); MODEL CODE EC 7-8 ("In the final analysis, however, the lawyer
should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods
because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself.")
The strong language of these Ethical Considerations is, of course, only hortatory. Even the require-
ment of Model Code DR 7-101(A)(1) that "[a] lawyer shall not intentionally ... [flail to seek the
lawful objectives of his clients through reasonably available means" is in the final analysis subject to a
determination by the lawyer or the legal profession of what means are "reasonably" available. See
Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 307, 321-33
(1980) (arguing that use of reasonable skill standard in informed consent case against attorney "leaves
the client at the mercy of the legal profession"); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND
PATIENT 48-85 (1984) (noting that use of reasonable doctor standard in informed consent cases under-
mines patient self-determination). Moreover, a footnote to the phrase "reasonably available means"
expressly refers, inter alia, to Canon 15 of the Canons, which provides that the lawyer "must obey his
own conscience and not that of his client." MODEL CODE DR 7-101(A)(1) n.67 (citing Canon 5).
269. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt.; MODEL RULES Rule 2.1 cmt.; MODEL CODE EC 7-8. See WOLF-
RAM, supra note 39, § 4.3, at 157-59.
270. Under Model Rule 1.16(b), without the client's permission, a lawyer may withdraw for any
reason "if the withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the
client .. " Even with such a "material adverse effect," a lawyer may withdraw if "a client insists upon
pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent" or "other good cause for
withdrawal exists." MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(b)(3), 1.16(b)(6). Under Model Code DR 2-
1 10(C)(1)(e), without the client's permission, a lawyer may withdraw if the client "[ilnsists, in a mat-
ter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment
and advice of the lawyer. ... In a matter pending before a tribunal, a lawyer may withdraw if the
lawyer "believes in good faith ...that the tribunal will find the existence of other good cause for
withdrawal" or if the client "[b]y other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry
out his employment effectively." MODEL CODE DR 2-110(C)(1)(6), l 10(C)(1)(d). Generally, if the
matter is pending before a tribunal, withdrawal is conditioned upon the tribunal's approval. MODEL
RULES Rule 1.16(c); MODEL CODE DR 2-110(A)(1). A court is likely to grant withdrawal in a crimi-
nal case unless the effect of such withdrawal "would be to require a continuance that would seriously
disrupt the progress of the case or if prior continuances have already been granted." WOLFRAM, supra
note 39, § 9.5.1, at 544 (footnote listing cases omitted). The same standards are applied in civil cases,
"although with less strictness." Id. § 9.5.1, at 545 (footnote listing cases omitted). See, e.g., Fisher v.
State, 248 So.2d 479, 486 (Fla. 1971) (withdrawal motions "should rarely be denied").
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profession. Rather than prescribe specific protections of consumer rights271
or limit the independence of the profession, the modern ethics codes reduce
legal ethics to binding rules through minimum standards for ethical con-
duct 272 that shrink the scope of areas governed by ethics from that pro-
posed by Sharswood. 273 The choice to narrow the area of conduct subject to
legal ethics codification has broadened the area subject to lawyer
discretion.
Another republican influence is the continuing ambivalence toward com-
mercial behavior. For example, advertising was prohibited until courts
voided limits on advertising on constitutional grounds. 27 4 While the Model
Code and the Model Rules continue Sharswood's skepticism of commercial
behavior, they also reject even his qualified faith in the market.275 The
Model Code and the Model Rules do not suggest that high ethical stan-
dards will lead to financial reward. Indeed, the Model Code expressly notes
that the small market of repeat players, which Sharswood's model as-
sumed, does not reflect the reality of modern practice.2"6
Accordingly, although the Model Code and Model Rules retreat from
Sharswood's faith in the self-policing nature of ethical standards, they con-
271. The ABA, for example, rejected the mild suggestion that the Model Rules require that con-
tracts for legal services be in writing. See STEPHEN GILLERS & RoY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 25-29 (1989) (comparing draft rules requiring written fee agree-
ments with Model Rules Rule 1.5 as adopted which prefers, but does not require, a written agreement).
Moreover, rules that relate to protecting clients, such as those mandating competence, are quite general
and do not specify minimum standards of acceptable lawyer conduct. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.1
(defining "competent representation" as "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasona-
bly necessary" for representation); MODEL CODE DR 6-101(A) (defining failure to act competently as
handling a legal matter which the lawyer "knows or should know that he is not competent to handle" or
"without preparation").
272. MODEL RULES Scope (noting that the Model Rules "do not ... exhaust the moral and ethical
considerations that should inform a lawyer"); MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement (observing that
Disciplinary Rules have narrower scope than aspirations of Ethical Considerations).
273. Sharswood, for example, provides guidelines for the exercise of conscience, see discussion supra
Parts IlI.B, IV.A, while the Model Code and Model Rules do not.
274. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD. JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §§ 7.1:101-
:103, at 856-60 (2d ed. 1990) (recounting history of ABA's restrictions on lawyer advertising and
subsequently struck down by the Supreme Court).
275. See supra Part IV.C.
276. Model Code EC 2-6 notes: "Formerly a potential client usually knew the reputations of local
lawyers for competency and integrity .. " Similarly, Model Code EC 2-7 observes:
Changed conditions ... have seriously restricted the effectiveness of the traditional selection
process. Often the reputations of lawyers are not sufficiently known to enable laypersons to
make intelligent choices. The law has become increasingly complex and specialized. Few
lawyers are willing and competent to deal with every kind of legal matter, and many layper-
sons have difficulty in determining the competence of lawyers to render different types of
legal services .... Lack of information about the availability of lawyers, the qualifications of
particular lawyers, and the expense of legal representation leads laypersons to avoid seeking
legal advice.
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tinue to include aspects of his republican vision of legal ethics.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REDISCOVERING SHARSWOOD'S REPUBLICAN
VISION
This Section examines the changes in the terrain of legal ethics scholar-
ship resulting from the rediscovery of Sharswood's republican vision. It ex-
plores how contemporary commentators have misread the legal ethics codes
and places Sharswood's contributions in the context of the modern debate
regarding the lawyer's role.
A. MISINTERPRETING SHARSWOOD AND THE LEGAL ETHICS CODES
As demonstrated above, the historical starting point for an exploration of
the legal ethics codes is Sharswood's republican vision. Although Shar-
swood's vision continues to influence the text of the contemporary ethical
codes, most commentators view legal ethics as having its origins in the law-
yer's obligations to the client, with the object being maximization of the
.client's goals within the limits of the law. Why have these commentators
failed to recognize the republican basis of our legal ethics codes and its
textual vestiges? Two factors appear to have contributed to the modern
misreading of the ethical codes. First, current commentators have failed to
examine thoroughly Sharswood's theoretical vision and its contribution to
the codes. Second, an adversarial reading of discretionary codes permits
lawyers publicly to proclaim their lack of moral accountability as advocates
while privately exercising broad control of client choices.
Most modern commentators, whether they favor or criticize the adver-
sary ethic, view it as the "dominant ethic ... embedded in our professional
codes. 2 7 7 They describe "the standard conception of the lawyer's role [as]
consisting of (1) a role obligation (the 'principle of partisanship') that iden-
tifies professionalism with extreme partisan zeal on behalf of the client and
(2) the 'principle of nonaccountability,' which insists that the lawyer bears
no moral responsibility for the client's goals or the means used to attain
them." 278
277. Thomas Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697,
697 (1988). See also FREEDMAN, supra note 34, at 65 (noting that the "ethic of zeal" is the " 'domi-
nant standard of lawyerly excellence' "); I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 274, §1.2:102, at 24 (argu-
ing that lawyers serve society best by zealously serving their clients); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Per-
spectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 594 (1985) (positing that the adversary ethic is
essential to a "well-ordered legal system"). But see Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Mis-
conception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1529, 1569 (suggesting that contrary to the standard
conception, "legal ethics has no paradigm, only some fragmentary conceptions of the lawyer's role
vying inconclusively for dominance") (footnote omitted).
278. LUBAN, supra note 38, at xx.
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Commentators suggest that this "standard conception-the principles of
partisanship and nonaccountability-accurately represents leading themes
in the official rules of the American legal profession." '279 In the view of
these commentators, the ethical codifications embody the notion that
"[l]awyers exist ... to vindicate the right of 'each member of our society.
.. to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to
present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense.' "280 These
commentators generally trace the historical roots of legal ethics to Lord
Henry Brougham's famous "credo" that " '[a]n advocate, in the discharge
of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his
client.' "281
Modern commentators do not entirely ignore the republican aspects of
the legal ethics codes. They acknowledge, for example, the lawyer's duty as
a public officer of candor to the court. 2 2 Their general view of these duties,
though, is that "when lawyers start talking this way about their public du-
ties, being officers of the court and so on, most of us understand that we
have left ordinary life far behind for the hazy aspirational world of the
Law Day sermon and Bar Association after-dinner speech-inspirational,
boozily solemn, anything but real." '283
As demonstrated in this article, however, these republican aspects are
central to the legal ethics codes. The roots of the codifications of legal eth-
ics are found in the concepts and language in Sharswood's essay that ex-
pressly reject Brougham's "credo" as the basis for ethical standards. 2 4 In-
stead, Sharswood articulates a republican vision of lawyers as a governing
class, the duties of which include advocacy. While important, advocacy re-
mains secondary to the lawyer's public duties, and must give way when it
conflicts with these duties.28 5 The legal ethics codes generally adopt Shar-
swood's perspective by continuing to describe lawyers as public officers and
to provide them with broad discretion as independent moral actors.28 6
One reason modern commentators have misread the basis for ethical
codes is their inattention to Sharswood's role. 287 As discussed earlier, Shar-
279. Id. at 393.
280. Stephen Ellman, Lawyers and Clients, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 717 (1987) (quoting Model Code
EC 7-1).
281. LUBAN, supra note 38, at 54.
282. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1084-
1090.
283. Gordon, Independence, supra note 81, at 13.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 94-107.
285. See supra Part IV.A.
286. See supra Part IV.
287. In contrast, as recently as the 1950s, commentators were sensitive to Sharswood's importance.
Henry Drinker, probably the leading ethics expert of that time, wrote that "[m]ost lawyers know of
Judge George Sharswood's Professional Ethics; many have read it. Very few, however, have read or
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swood has largely disappeared from modern commentary. His work is con-
sidered in a cursory way that makes little attempt to analyze-his theoretical
perspective and its continuing influence. 288 Even those few commentators
who have addressed his theoretical perspective have failed to recognize the
-dual republican and adversarial character of his approach. 28 9 The dearth of
analysis of Sharswood's essay may well have resulted from a disinclination
to question the perceived wisdom that the adversarial ethic is the historical
basis of legal ethics.
In some sense, this neglect of the republican origins of the ethics codes
may have served the interests of the bar. The established wisdom permits
lawyers to have the best of both worlds. The adversarial ethic allows them
to disclaim to the public any moral responsibility for their actions. 290 At the
same time, retention of a republican vision in the codes permit them to
exercise broad discretion to refuse client instructions, whether that discre-
tion is based on expertise, morality or self-interest. 291 In effect, lawyers
have most of the power and none of the responsibility. But maybe this par-
adox has not fully escaped the public. Perhaps the continuing low esteem of
the profession results, in part, from a sense that lawyers are pulling a fast
one.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SHARSWOOD'S REDISCOVERY FOR THE DEBATE
ABOUT THE LAWYER'S PROPER ROLE
This section explores the implications of placing the ethics codes in their
historical context for critics and defenders of the adversarial model of legal
ethics. The Section, however, does not take a normative position on Shar-
swood's republican vision or attempt to identify which of the current ap-
proaches best exemplifies the republican perspective.
To critics, Sharswood's vision offers a historical precedent. While some
critics of the adversarial system have identified a republican tradition of
lawyering, they have not recognized that tradition's important role in the
even know of any other book on the subject." DRINKER, supra note 7, at ix. Drinker described his goal
in writing his now classic treatise on legal ethics as providing "a modern book on the subject which
would apply the eternal principles [stated by Sharswood] to present conditions. Id.
288. See supra Part 11.B.
289. See id.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 290-94.
291. See supra Parts IV.B, IV.C. Indeed, a number of empirical studies have suggested that many
lawyers manipulate clients to achieve the lawyers' financial and professional interests. E.g., DOUGLAS E.
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974); Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and
Client Meet: Observations of Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law
Office, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 177 (1986); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence
Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, I LAW & Soc'Y REV. 15, 22-31 (1967).
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development of the legal ethics codes. 292 Locating the republican vision in
the essay which is the basic source of our legal ethics codes offers strong
historical grounding for the critics' perspective.
In addition, the rediscovery of Sharswood poses challenges for critics of
the adversary system. First, it requires them to confront the normative im-
plications of a non-adversarial ethic. Modern theorists, like Sharswood
before them, vest the lawyer with independent moral responsibility. For
example, Professor David Luban advises lawyers to be "moral activists," 293
and Professor William Simon recommends that lawyers choose the course
of action "most likely to promote justice. 294
While Sharswood and the modern theorists would agree that at a mini-
mum independent moral responsibility carries a duty to the rule of law,
they would be likely to disagree as to how to construe the full extent of
that responsibility. Sharswood, for example, works from a political theory
that places great value on protection of private property, including mini-
mizing the intrusion by government into business affairs. 295 Luban and Si-
mon, on the other hand, write in part from a concern that wealthy persons
and organizations have disproportionate legal resources. They ask lawyers
to limit their assistance to business interests and to pursue legal activism,
including government intervention, to protect the disadvantaged.2 96 Profes-
sor Robert Gordon suggests that these apparently contradictory perspec-
tives can be reconciled by recognizing the "modern counterpart" to Shar-
swood's protection of "propertied minorities" from "levelling popular
legislatures" as the protection of "'discrete and insular minorities' . . .
from dangers from the majority. ' 297 Nevertheless, disparate perspectives on
rule of law and the common good exist within the legal profession. Absent
a consensus on governance goals, providing lawyers with moral discretion
will not achieve the critics' goals of lawyering to promote their vision of
justice. 298
292. Gordon, Independence, supra note 81, at 14-17. Particularly, Professor Gordon noted that
"[tihe 'republican' vocabulary of civic 'virtue,' once employed to explain why lawyers should be at least
somewhat independent of the major powers and factions of civil society, is rather out of fashion." Id. at
17 (footnote citing sources "reviving" the republican discourse omitted).
293. In calling for "moral activism" for lawyers, Professor Luban envisages a "law practice in which
the lawyer who disagrees with the morality or justice of a client's ends does not simply terminate the
relationship, but tries to influence the client for the better." LUBAN, supra note 38, at 160.
294. Simon, supra note 282, at 1090.
295. See supra Part III.B.
296. E.g., LUBAN, supra note 38, at 160-74, 293-316; Simon, supra note 282, at 1090-1119.
297. Letter dated August 12, 1992 from Professor Robert W. Gordon to the author at 2 (quoting
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
298. Consensus may indeed exist in support of the less sweeping proposition that rule of law requires
basic procedural ground rules. Cf. Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49
MD. L. REV. 255, 258-61 (1990).
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A second and related challenge arises from the generality of any vision
of lawyering grounded in the lawyer's exercise of independent moral judg-
ment. Sharswood's vision nonetheless offers useful assistance to practition-
ers because it satisfies two conditions. One, practitioners who share a high
moral character and an understanding of what is moral will presumably
exercise judgment in a similar way. 299 Two, Sharswood's standards are suf-
ficiently detailed and grounded in a particular vision of the lawyer's role to
suggest guidelines for when and how a lawyer should apply independent
judgment.300 Absent either of these conditions, non-adversarial theories
which ask lawyers to promote justice will generally provide little guidance
to practitioners seeking to resolve ethical dilemmas. In that event, they run
the risk of degenerating into idealistic masks for confusion or hypocrisy.
The third challenge that the rediscovery of Sharswood poses for critics of
the adversarial system is the realization that the spirit of the ethics codes
which they attack is their own. Professor David Luban, for example, has
recommended that "the rules be redrafted to allow lawyers to forego im-
moral tactics or the pursuit of unjust ends without withdrawing, even if
their clients insist that they use tactics or pursue these ends."30 1 A reading
of the codes in light of Sharswood's contribution, however, reveals that to
achieve Luban's goal they need not be redrafted. In the civil context, only
the decision to settle must be the client's. All other decisions, whether
weighted toward the client, fall within the lawyer's discretion.30 2 Lawyers
also need not accept cases they believe unjust.3 3 That goes most of the way
toward achieving Luban's goal of "allow[ing] lawyers to forego immoral
tactics or the pursuit of unjust ends without withdrawing. . . ." When you
permit withdrawal and consider its relatively liberal availability,30 4 the law-
yer can avoid following instructions of a client who makes an objectionable
determination even of whether to settle, the only civil decision required to
be in the client's discretion.
Ironically, even the anti-republican move from ethical guidelines to bind-
ing rules has resulted in broad scope for attorney discretion. The shift to
rules could have been accompanied by more specific provisions to protect
consumer interests and to instruct lawyers as to the details of competent,
ethical lawyering. Instead, the republican faith in the virtue of lawyers re-
sulted in a shift which only narrowed the focus of the stated norms for
299. See supra Part IV.A.
300. See supra Parts III.B., IV.A.
301. LUBAN, supra note 38, at 159.
302. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 270.
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lawyer conduct to provide a minimum standard for ethical conduct, °5 leav-
ing greater room for the individual lawyer's subjective exercise of
conscience.
The realization that the codes permit a non-adversarial ethic leads to a
fourth challenge to critics of the adversarial system. Most of them argue
that lawyers' actions under the existing codes are often immoral.30 6 Analy-
sis of Sharswood's republican vision reminds us, however, that ethical
schemes providing lawyers with broad discretion rely on an assumption
that lawyers are capable of, and will tend toward, moral conduct. 07 There-
fore, if, as the modern critics assert, lawyers who currently have discretion
do not exercise it appropriately, the critics need to explain how lawyers
could be made to act more virtuously in the future.
Sharswood's republican vision poses an equally powerful challenge to de-
fenders of the adversarial ethic. Despite the consensus that the adversarial
ethic is the foundation of legal ethics, the Code and the Rules do not re-
quire a lawyer to follow client instructions. Indeed, as discussed in Part IV,
the vestiges of that vision in the content and language of the codes provide
lawyers with broad discretion to reject or ignore clients' instructions. This
textual analysis is consistent with the empirical evidence that, except for
corporate practice,30 8 lawyers tend to follow their own self-interest when it
conflicts with the interests of their clients.309 Accordingly, advocates of the
adversarial ethic, rather than its critics, need to suggest major changes in
the ethical codes.
A further challenge to defenders of the adversarial ethic is perhaps more
symbolic than substantive. Analysis of survivals of Sharswood's republican
vision reminds us that republican duties, such as candor to the court and
conformity to law, expressly limit the obligation to the client of a lawyer
who decides to follow client instructions. While most lawyers would proba-
bly concede these limitations, they apparently do not acknowledge that
such limitations make Lord Brougham's credo that the lawyer "knows but
one person in all the world, and that is his client" as inaccurate a descrip-
tion of the lawyer's ethical duties as the boast of Professor Gordon's hypo-
thetical Law Day sermon about the bar's service to the common good.
VI. CONCLUSION
An examination of the origin of the legal ethics codes in Judge George
305. See supra Parts IV.B., Iv.C.
306. E.g., LUBAN, supra note 38, at 148-58; Simon, supra note 292, at 1090-1119.
307. See supra Part IV.A.
308. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and
Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504-05 (1985).
309. See supra note 291.
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Sharswood's essays supports a new reading of the legal ethics codes. Shar-
swood's ethical standards were derived from the lawyer's republican role as
a public officer exercising independent moral discretion. He concluded that
when republican duties conflicted with adversary duties to the client, the
adversary duties must yield. Sharswood's essay was the basis for the Ca-
nons and its concepts and language survived in the Code and the Rules.
Accordingly, although current commentators describe the codes as embod-
ying the adversarial ethic, the codes in fact continue Sharswood's approach
to the extent that they permit the lawyer discretion to reject or ignore cli-
ent instructions.
This rediscovery of Sharswood and his contribution has implications for
the recent debate regarding the lawyer's role. While providing critics of the
adversarial ethic with historical grounding, it challenges them to clarify
their strategies for achieving their goals, including explaining how to
achieve consensus on normative objectives and elevate lawyer's moral stan-
dards. For proponents of the adversarial ethic, on the other hand, the chal-
lenge is to modify the codes to require lawyers to serve their clients.
Sharswood leaves us with one final challenge. By his republican ap-
proach to lawyer's ethics, he asserts in effect that legal ethics standards in
large part define the nature of our society. 30 This claim is stunning, espe-
cially at a time when the reputation of lawyers is so low.31' If, upon assess-
ing Sharswood's assertion, we find that it has any merit, we will have to
remake the field of legal ethics.
310. See supra Part III.B.
311. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 34, at 1239-40 (describing the seemingly chronic dissatisfaction of
the public with lawyers).
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